This text comes from our book, Light to the Nations, Part 2.
For several years after the Algeciras conference, Morocco caused little trouble between the European powers. When, during a civil war in Morocco in 1907, France landed troops at Casablanca to protect French citizens, even Germany did not object. Another small controversy between the two countries over Morocco was resolved peacefully in May 1909.
But in October 1910, the Moroccan tribes revolted against the sultan, and by March 1911 were laying siege to the capital city of Fez. Helpless against the revolutionaries, the sultan along with the foreign consuls in Fez asked for help, and France landed troops in Morocco. By May the French had freed Fez and occupied the city.
Germany’s new chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, swiftly condemned the landing of French troops in Morocco, calling it a violation of the Algeciras agreement. Bethmann-Hollweg said his government would accept the occupation of Morocco only if France gave some compensation to Germany for breaking the agreement. Germany’s demands, however, were excessive, and the French refused to consider them.
With talks between France and Germany going nowhere, the German foreign secretary, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, suggested using a little pressure on the French. Send a small warship to Morocco, Kiderlen-Wächter told the kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg; it would be a sign to the Triple Entente (France, Great Britain, and Russia) that they had better not ignore Germany in discussing the future of Morocco and Africa. Though Wilhelm and his chancellor were reluctant to agree to Kiderlen-Wächter’s plan, in the end they approved it.
On July 1, 1911, the German imperial warship, Panther, steamed into the Moroccan port of Agadir. The German government claimed it had sent the warship to protect German mining interests in the area and hinted that it would not withdraw the Panther from Agadir as long as French troops were in Fez. To the British, it appeared Germany was trying to claim a part of Morocco for herself; but the new French government under Premier Joseph Caillaux was eager to keep the peace and so agreed to negotiate with Germany.
On July 15, Germany presented her demands: France would have to give over the entire French Congo to Germany; in return, Germany would give France a part of the German colony of Cameroon and would recognize France’s right to occupy Morocco. Such demands were too much for the French, and they refused to consider them. On July 21, Prime Minister David Lloyd George made a speech in the British Parliament that Germany took as a threat of war. Just as in the First Moroccan Crisis, it was clear that Great Britain would stand with France.
Unwilling to go to war with Britain, Germany reduced her demands. After many negotiations, Germany and France signed the Treaty of Berlin in November 1911. In this treaty, Germany recognized France’s right to intervene in Morocco and turned over to France the territory near Lake Chad in Cameroon. For her part, France gave a portion of the French Congo to Germany, so that Cameroon could have access to the Congo River.
So ended the Second Moroccan Crisis. War had been avoided, but in France ill feeling toward Germany intensified. In January 1912, Raymond Poincaré, a nationalist, became premier of France, and nationalists and conservatives took most of the seats in the National Assembly. The new French government wanted to make sure France was ready for war, if it came, and in 1912 even began drafting men from French-controlled Algeria into the French army. In Germany, too, nationalists and militarists in the Reichstag and Bundestag, fearing Russia’s support of Pan-Slavism and France’s preparations for war, passed a law in May 1912 to increase the size of the already large German army.
Upon being elected president of France in 1913, Poincaré made it clear that he supported the goal of strengthening the French military even further. It is “impossible,” he said in his inaugural address, “for a people to be really peaceful, except on condition of being always prepared for war.” On March 6, a bill to expand the army was introduced into the National Assembly. Radical republicans and socialists opposed the bill, and workingmen in the cities held mass protests against it; but, in the end, it was passed. In response, the German parliament in April 1913 approved a bill to further enlarge the German army. By 1914, Germany’s peacetime army numbered 870,000 men.
The size of Germany’s army and the fact that by 1914 Germany had the second-largest navy in the world, alarmed the Triple Entente—Great Britain, France, and Russia. Britain began preparing its army for a possible war on the European continent, pledged military aid to Belgium, if Germany decided to invade that land, and entered into secret military agreements with France. That governments made secret agreements with one another was well known and only increased the feeling of distrust European leaders had for each other.
All of Europe was now, it seemed, on the brink of war. What would spark a full-scale war and where the spark would fall was anyone’s guess; but many were certain that war would certainly come. It was only a matter of time.
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